THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF TIME

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Master of Arts in The History and Circulation of Philosophical Ideas

1. Mascolo, Armando. "L'évasion de l'être. Jean-Paul Sartre and the Phenomenology of Temporality." In *The Concept of Time in Early Twentieth-Century Philosophy: A Philosophical Thematic Atlas*, edited by Flavia Santoianni, 77-85. Cham: Springer, 2016.

Opening with an epigraph from Charles Baudelaire's famous poem *L'Horloge*—"Remember that time is an avid player that need not cheat to win"—and rooted in "a retracing of Sartre's phenomenological ontology" as it is outlined in *Being and Nothingness*, Armando Mascolo's essay discusses existential time as "a permanent existence out of oneself" and addresses the phenomenological perspective of temporality by providing a theoretical framework of Sartre's ontology and of the context in which the philosopher introduces his thoughts on time, that is, in the context of an "ontology of consciousness and freedom." An ontological approach to the phenomenology of time might appear confusing or perhaps too convoluted for an already complex problem, but given that it is a study of the ontological experience, it is in fact worthwhile to approach time and temporality from such an angle, more so involving Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*, which Mascolo does aptly and in a well-rounded manner, albeit somewhat compact, given the demands of a single chapter in a collective volume, and requiring an understanding of Sartre beyond that of general knowledge, which is an observation rather than a problem, as the volume containing the essay is one that provides a specialized view on the philosophical concept of time. If, for Sartre and according to Mascolo, temporality represents "the very essence of consciousness," then "time does not exist by itself but only as a process of temporalization of consciousness," this affirmation being not only a key part of the essay, but also one to which we can bind aspects of consciousness studies that linger on the threshold between phenomenology and the philosophy of mind, perhaps pulling away from the mind-body problem, and towards the mind-time experience, at least for the duration of engaging with Sartre's concept of time from a phenomenological point of view.

2. Reynolds, Jack. "'Intrinsic Time' and the Minimal Self: Reflections on the Methodological and Metaphysical Significance of Temporal Experience." In

Phenomenology and Science: Confrontations and Convergences, edited by Jack Reynolds and Richard Sebold, 23-45. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.

Part of a volume on phenomenology and science that aims to investigate the sometimes-fraught relationship between the two, Jack Reynolds' essay, like many writings on temporality, including those of philosophers like Paul Ricoeur or Hans-Georg Gadamer, makes use of Saint Augustine's *What then is time?* 'thought experiment' in order to frame the matter of time within the confinements of lived experience and first-person perspective. Reynolds delves further into the issue of what this question involves, weaving the arguments of the essay around the relationship between phenomenology and naturalism, and the one between phenomenology and empirical science. In the background, yet still essential, the author places matters such as various phenomenological claims regarding temporality, but also the claim that "phenomenologists do not agree about anything at all," albeit a claim that perhaps, in modern philosophy, is no longer as prevalent as before, which can also be stated about the criticism of phenomenology as a much-too-subjective branch of philosophy. However, the author makes excellent use of this claim by bringing forth from within it a personal argument on what best characterizes the work of phenomenologists, one that it is divided into three theses: the presence of a minimal pre-reflective self-awareness, its connection to temporal structures and "intrinsic time," and the fact that this self-awareness enables a certain stability of perception when it comes to the position of the phenomenologist.. With this framework established—of phenomenologists and how they conduct their work—Reynolds further constructs a metaphysics of *intrinsic time* that crosses through temporality's relationship with nature, noting that if we are to state the need for a *datum* which "cannot be accommodated by any scientific naturalism that aims to eliminate or reduce the first-person perspective," we must also provide an account for why this particular approach is necessary and has to be maintained, that is, "an account of the temporal dimensions of the first-person perspective." It is in the course of this argument that the need for a proper dialogue between phenomenology and science is highlighted, supporting thus not only the claims of the essay, but also those of the volume as a whole, and making clearer the idea that privileging one over the other, if it is to be done, needs to stand a foundation of comprehensive reasonings.

3. Tyman, Stephen. "The Phenomenology of Forgetting." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 44, no. 1 (1983): 45–60. https://doi.org/10.2307/2107579.

The role that forgetting plays in philosophical thought can often be overlooked or placed in the background of contemporary inquiries, especially when it comes to phenomenology. This might occur more so in the case of the phenomenology of time and its relation to memory, both turning their attention more to what we remember, and how, than to what we forget from lived time, although preservation is of course shaped also by what is lost, in certain instances, perhaps to an even greater degree, or not being able to, even not wanting to address the matters of how events in the past that we have forgotten play a role in memory. Stephen Tyman's paper from 1983 shines a light on the concept of forgetting for a general audience, though from a much-needed phenomenological point of view, discussing aspects such as the primal intuition of time, temporal consciousness, transcendence, specifically with a Heideggerian approach, the retentional framework as it relates to continuity, and the finite nature of consciousness, but also the Husserlian idea that one must be aware of forgetting in order for forgetting to be that which we call *forgetting*. The paper also argues that both retention and forgetting are psychologically revealing acts, that they provide a language for the ways of the mental phenomenon and a conceptualization of personal time through the lenses of this phenomenon, even if this argument is not sufficient unto itself when it comes to reflectively assessing what the two represent in the existence of the *freely reflective individual*, as stated by the author. In lieu of a conclusion, as a final argument but also an opening towards new inquiries, Tyman quotes from French psychiatrist Eugène Minkowski and his book on lived time, and states that Husserl's transcendental ego "represents an important and abiding insight" in helping the phenomenology of forgetting to point us in the direction of gaining a reflective responsibility of our *cognitive situation*.

4. Waldenfels, Bernhard, and Derrick Calandrella. "Time Lag: Motifs for a Phenomenology of the Experience of Time." *Research in Phenomenology* 30 (2000): 107–19. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24654799.

If one thinks of the experience of time from a phenomenological standpoint, there might exist a temptation to say that studying it is sufficient, but, as this paper also details, a meaningful analysis of time needs to be accompanied by an understanding of the *logos of time*, which is, according to the author, "the way we think time, talk about it, and present it." Succinctly tracing various *times* through philosophy and even literature, such as the time of speech, the time of the senses, the time of forgetting and remembering, and the time of the Other, Waldenfels pieces together a hermeneutics of time that concerns itself not only with the meaning of the experience of time, but also with certain problems that might arise, such as self-referentiality,

and indirect modes of access, i.e. "the difference between saying and showing." At the center of the paper's arguments lies the issue of a *time lag*, which comes forth, for instance, "when we change from one time system to another." A secondary but highly interesting aspect of the present paper is that it creates an enthralling effect of entwining with itself, and it does so with the help of questions that are addressed not necessarily in order to be answered, but rather to fit one into the other like a kind of phenomenological Matryoshka. For instance, the author raises the question of perceiving time with the senses; from it, the question of what is perception; and further, the concept of *rhythm* as it accounts for the *return of the same*; all the while gathering arguments from Augustine, Kant, Bergson, Merleau-Ponty, and others. The last chapter, on the time of the Other, cements the concept of the *time lag*, by introducing a new dimension of temporality in relation to the interaction with another, *giving time* rather than just *needing* it.

5. Ricoeur, Paul. "The Human Experience of Time and Narrative." *Research in Phenomenology* 9 (1979): 17–34. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24654326.

In "The Human Experience of Time and Narrative," a lecture delivered in 1979 at the University of Paris, Paul Ricoeur addresses, as he himself states, "the epistemology of the narrative function and the phenomenology of time experience," an endeavor that the philosopher undertook in many of his writings, and one which emphasizes two of his essential ideas: 'that narratives occur in time" and that narrative activity provides "a privileged access to the way we articulate our experience of time." Concerning the latter, Ricoeur notes that it is neglected by the phenomenology of time-experience. In this lecture, in fact, in the introduction of this lecture, Paul Ricoeur summarizes his thought of narrative and temporality in a succinct manner, one that however encompasses a complex philosophy, when he says: "narrativity is the mode of discourse through which the mode of being which we call temporality, or temporal being, is brought to language." As we know from the philosopher's oeuvre, language is indeed a way of creating meaning, one that shapes our understanding of the world, and the act of placing it at the center of the relationship between narrativity and temporality illuminates both hermeneutics and phenomenology. Introducing first the problematics of time, such as the specificity of human experience of time, the paradox which arises from the fact that the present of one is not always the present of the other nor is it the present of the world, Ricoeur turns to narrative in order to provide solutions for these problems and paradoxes, but the narrative discourse is not without its issues, and thus one must handle narrative forms in accordance with

certain classifications. The philosopher also states the advantages of seeing the narrative discourse as useful to a better understanding of our experience of time, such as the fact that an analysis which starts from a *plot* is a more thorough one, an argument that the philosopher also uses as a sort of meta-analysis of the current lecture/paper. In fact, perhaps with the occasion of a second reading, one can notice that Ricoeur has formulated his argument of the importance of narrative discourse to work not only when discussing temporality and the experience of time, but also the framing of the discussion itself. We thus reach a better understanding of narrative and of the narrative discourse precisely through the means that speak of their merits.

6. Hansen, Mark. "The Time of Affect, or Bearing Witness to Life." *Critical Inquiry* 30, no. 3 (2004): 584–626. https://doi.org/10.1086/421163.

Mark Hansen's paper addresses the experience of time from the perspective of the interaction with a work of art, that is, the time of the image, and of the body as creator and subject and audience, through the lens of subjectivity. The work of art in question is *Anima*, by American video artist Bill Viola, a color video triptych shown on three LCD flat panels, the work itself being one on the threshold, the artist speaking of an intention to push the boundaries of the video medium as far as possible. Also on the threshold, between art criticism and phenomenological inquiry, Hansen's paper discusses a time that is perhaps overlooked by those who concern themselves with the phenomenology of the lived time experience, as being one far too subjective even for the phenomenological field, that is, the time of the art experience, or, as Hansen called it, *the time of the affect*. But, as the title already hints, this particular kind of time is not one that corresponds solely to our interactions with works of art, but rather one that speaks to the manner in which we witness life. The choice to provide a phenomenological reading of this paper illuminates not only aspects that relate to art, or to art criticism, and the philosophy of art, but also to temporal objects and how they can hold various meanings. According to Hansen, *Anima* does more than open the viewers to the past; "it brings them face to face with the texture of the now," an affirmation further strengthened by Bill Viola stating that emotions are "the time-forms of our own personal lives." Through a comprehensive discussion of Viola's videos, Mark Hansen develops a phenomenology of the experience of time as it becomes the experience of the work of art, which circles back to being time itself—the time of contemplation, the time of intentionality, the time of bearing witness to life.

7. Vallega-Neu, Daniela. “Disseminating Time: Durations, Configurations, and Chance.” *Research in Phenomenology* 47, no. 1 (2017): 1–18. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26563891.

Exploring the notion of duration in the philosophy of Henri Bergson with the purpose of a new reading of said concept, one that does not bind or center itself specifically to human consciousness, though not before providing an overview of the temporal problem in Western thought, “Disseminating Time” states its claim boldly: “we may have a concept of time as such but (…) strictly speaking, there *is* no ‘time as such’; (…) time is always embodied.” It is with this premise that Daniela Vallega-Neu addresses the issue of time’s dissemination and its many configurations, and within this framework that the paper engages with Bergson’s duration. Employing concepts such as rhythm, temporal configurations, or chance, Vallega-Neu drafts a phenomenology of the dissemination of time that works as a deconstruction that decouples time from the “primacy of subjectivity” in order to “scatter and multiply” the senses of time. In support of a definition of *temporal configurations*, the author turns to the work of David Wood, specifically, *Time after Time*, in which Wood engages with the notion of the *end of time*, and *time shelters*, which are named *local economies of time* by Wood. While Vallega-Neu also introduces various questions that might arise from these concepts and their role in the dissemination of time, such as “which durations could be called our own,” engaging with them in a comprehensive manner is left somewhere outside of the text, or perhaps to the readers themselves, a fact that does not hurt the paper, on the contrary, as it sustains a sense of flow, of rhythm that passes through its pages, in support of a mellifluous phenomenology of scattered time. But yes, beyond the philosophical, Vallega-Neu’s approach can also be seen as a poetical one, or rather, a melodic one, given the discussion about rhythm and the presence of the composer John Cage’s “predilection for the sense of chance,” which the author of this paper makes use of in order to better illustrate the belief that “chance characterizes the duration of things or events.” And it is perhaps the concept of chance that lies at the heart of the author’s argument, even more so than that of duration, and even more than how it relates to, or how it *is* duration.

8. Minkowski, Eugène. *Lived Time: Phenomenological and Psychopathological Studies*. Translated by Nancy Metzel. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970.

Eugène Minkowski's book is perhaps one of the most cited psychopathological resources in the exegesis pertaining to the phenomenology of time. The psychiatrist, known for the use of phenomenology within psychopathology, proposes here a consideration of time from the

perspective of various mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia, dementia, manic depression, and others. That is, Minkowski advances an analysis of lived time through the sieve of these conditions in order to further develop a theory of distortion of space and time on account of mental illness. The book also provides an overview of the phenomenology of time, blending the psychiatric depictions of Swiss psychiatrist and humanist Paul Eugen Bleurer, with the philosophical writings of Edmund Husserl and Henri Bergson. *Lived Time* is divided into two parts—a part about the temporal aspects of life, that addresses being and becoming from a temporal point of view, also from one that involves flow and succession, fraction and continuation, or the phenomenon of the élan. This first section also addresses issues such as contact with reality, lived synchronism, the future, and finally, the decline of life, followed by death. The second part is the one where Minkowski discusses the spatiotemporal structures of mental illness, with two general subchapters and then distinct subchapters for each condition, and a final section on the psychopathology of lived time, where he readdresses the problem of space, but also how the discussed notions can be applied in psychopathology. Entwining together philosophical and psychological knowledge with everyday examples and experiences, *Lived Time* is more than what an initial read of its structure might suggest, an in-depth and rigorous analysis of time lived in the thralls of a mental condition, as it opens itself and welcomes the experience of its readers, becoming thus a profound meditation on the importance of time, of which Minkowski himself writes that should be seen as what refers to "participation contemporaneous with ambient events." "Being sick in relation to time," continues Minkowski, means no longer having the sensation of "participating in ambient events." Further, he connects this experience with the philosophy of Henri Bergson, stating that such a patient "is not living, as Bergson says, 'what is new at each moment of history'." In his reading of lived time through the lens of mental conditions that can alter that very experience, Minkowski supplements the here-and-now with the self (*me-here-now*), thus creating a phenomenology of being and becoming in time that is not only inclusive, but also eye-opening for a wide array of phenomenological concerns.

9. Draxelbauer, Benjamin. "Time and Oblivion: A Phenomenological Study on Oblivion." In *The Subjective(s) of Phenomenology: Rereading Husserl*, edited by Iulian Apostolescu, 215-229. Cham: Springer, 2020.

Part of a volume that provides new readings of Husserl's philosophy, "Time and Oblivion" presents itself as a "phenomenological analysis of the phenomenon of oblivion," as it appears in Husserl, "emerging on the edge of time-consciousness," and traces this phenomenon through

the early and late writings of the philosopher, connecting it to intentionality and to intentional-consciousness. After offering a few preliminary remarks on oblivion and how it relates to its own understanding, Draxelbauer delves into Husserlian thought, also noting that the philosopher's work on oblivion is not one that can be called complete, nor does it present itself in a systematic manner. In regards to the latter, it can be seen as a secondary task of the present essay, to systematically develop *oblivion* as it stood within the framework of Husserl's time phenomenology. Draxelbauer also analyzes aspects of what might have contributed to a rethinking of oblivion in Husserl's philosophy, stating that it was "the relationship between retentionality and intentionality," developing also the argument of how oblivion does not present itself at a first *reading* as something that is in "an intentional relation to actual presence." The question that arises from Husserl's early mentions of oblivion is one that the author too notes, that is, how can we think—or how must we think—of past experiences with which we are no longer engaging in terms of *intentionality*, and also one that the author provides answers for from the later works of Husserl, in which, according to Draxelbauer, the philosopher directly addresses oblivion by changing how he views retentionality. As it is part of a volume that engages the readership with *rereadings* of Husserl, a firm grasp of Husserl's philosophical thought is indeed essential for the reading of this essay, more so, a grasp that is able to recognize such shifts in thought as Draxelbauer does, or at least, to follow the thread proposed by the author of the present essay in terms of making an essential distinction between earlier and later writings of the philosopher.

10. Wood, David. *The Deconstruction of Time*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2001.

Written initially in 1985 as a PhD thesis at the University of Warwick, *The Deconstruction of Time*, published in the 2001 edition with a new preface in which the author reexamines the "conversation between time as structure and time as event," is not so much a book on the phenomenology of time but a companion for such works. Addressing and rejecting the view that the importance of time has been erased from philosophy by its deconstruction, from Nietzsche to Derrida, David Wood argues for the contrary, that is, that time has only gained more importance, and a better place in philosophy through deconstruction, which in fact does not erase, but rather testify for the critical significance of time and temporality. Since this is, in part, a book about how we think about our thinking of time, it can prove valuable for researchers in the phenomenology of time and readers alike, as it presents a point of view on the manner in which we express the experience of time within the philosophical framework. The book is

divided into four parts, three addressing a different thinker (Nietzsche, Husserl, and Heidegger) also from the perspective of Derrida's reading of their work, and the fourth being a chapter on time beyond deconstruction. The idea that time is an abstraction is not only difficult to comprehend, as the author himself states in the preface, but also difficult to undertake as phenomenal subject, and it is perhaps in the support of such an endeavor that *The Deconstruction of Time* can prove itself useful—by providing a framework within which to tackle how this aspect relates to the narrative of our experience of time. "Even if time is an idealization," writes Wood, "it is also an idealization that permeates the real. It is with these kinds of considerations that the deconstruction of time is concerned."

11. Warren, Nicolas de. *Husserl and the Promise of Time: Subjectivity in Transcendental Phenomenology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

A detailed analysis of Husserl's phenomenology of time-consciousness that often focuses its attention on the concept of subjectivity, Nicolas de Warren's book is written in a manner that, as the author also states, establishes a suggestive tone rather than a conclusive one, making it a fruitful reading experience for both those who are new to the subject and those who wish to deepen their knowledge of Husserl's approach to time-consciousness. Readers of *Husserl and the Promise of Time* will also encounter various biographical accounts, which serve to ground Husserl's thought not only in the context of contemporaneous thought, but also in that of Husserl's own life and preoccupations. The book is divided into seven chapters that discuss, among others, a tracing of Husserl's thoughts on time from Franz Brentano psychology and his theory of *original association* reconstructed from his lectures, the retention of time past—an analysis of remembrance as well as imagination—Husserl's refutation of transcendental solipsism, and the ramifications of the time-consciousness phenomenology, which are discussed in the final chapter. It is important to note that Nicolas de Warren draws the reader's attention to his own subjectivity, that is, to the process of drafting the book as being one influenced by his own interpretation, all the while aiming for a balance between Husserl's thought and the manner in which it is interpreted by the author. Given that Husserl's phenomenology of time-consciousness is often considered a difficult subject for which to undertake an interpretation, the book is a welcomed addition to the exegesis created around the philosopher's works, one that, as previously stated, can be of interest to a broader audience, but also which does not read as a repetition of other interpretations, for those who are more than familiar with Husserl's thought.

12. Brough, John B., and Lester E. Embree, eds. *The Many Faces of Time*. Dordrecht: Springer, 2000.

A collection of essays on temporality as central to phenomenology, *The Many Faces of Time* follows in the tradition of established phenomenologists towards an even deeper understanding of the constitution of time, and the relationship that exists between temporality, the self, and the world, while also tackling topics such as historical time and plastic time, that is, time and the visual arts from the perspective of the temporal experiencing of art works. A well-rounded volume, that addresses numerous aspects of time phenomenology and the manner in which "the material concept of temporalization" is thought and understood, the book builds on the foundation of traditional phenomenology and on the works of philosophers such as Husserl, Heidegger, or Sartre, reaching a conclusion drawn from the final essay of the collection, on art and the experience of the art work, that "time permeates our experience far more thoroughly and deeply than we commonly realize." Worthy of mentioning is also the essay titled "Generative Experience of Time," by Klaus Held, as it addresses aspects of time and time phenomenology that shine a light upon the primordial questions of philosophy's desire to understand time, such as what *compels us to direct our attention in the direction of time*, aspects that are sometimes written as already understood, or dealt with, and thus left out of phenomenological inquiries that might otherwise benefit from their analysis. There is perhaps in this particular essay an argument akin to that of Paul Ricoeur, as it speaks of the manner in which humans can relate their experience of time through storytelling, but also of the importance of logos and language as the means to provide an account of our lives in time.

13. Kelly, Michael R. *Phenomenology and the Problem of Time*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.

Addressing immanence and time in the works of Martin Heidegger, Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Jacques Derrida, Michael R. Kelly's *Phenomenology and the Problem of Time* aims to provide a new perspective on phenomenology and Husserl's phenomenological thought, at times through the lenses of its critics, such as Heidegger, not only in what is related to Husserl's desire to break with a certain way of defining immanence, but also in terms of grasping the manner in which phenomenology can often isolate itself within its own method. The latter, addressed by the author in the preface, can be, as also the author states, illuminated by an understanding of the problem of time as being "the most important and difficult of all phenomenological problems." It is worth noting that the author calls Husserl's analysis of immanence imperfect, stating that it shares "modern subjective idealism's aspiration of

philosophy as the foundation of all sciences," by reducing all awareness to a narrow and narrowing relationship, that between a *knowing subject* and a *known object*. Kelly also addresses Husserl's notion of time-consciousness, as well as transcendence and the transcendental, in Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, respectively, reserving the last chapter, the conclusion, for the ultratranscendental and Jacques Derrida, of whose *Speech and Phenomena* Kelly argues that it "presents a more sustained and precise critique of Husserl in light of the problem of time and (or for) phenomenology than that offered by Heidegger or Merleau-Ponty," while also appraising, toward the very end, that Derrida's deconstruction of phenomenology should not be seen as a narrative on the end or loss of this particular branch of philosophy.

14. Dainton, Barry. *Stream of Consciousness: Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience.* London, New York: Routledge, 2003.

As stated in its preface, the book aims to provide an account of the unity and continuity that can be found in our stream of consciousness, focusing on aspects that relate to the fundamental characteristics of consciousness through a phenomenological inquiry into the aspects of conscious life. Drafted around the structure of consciousness and issues such as phenomenal space, introspection, the nature of awareness, and time-consciousness, its nine chapters offer a glimpse into how experiences occur, more so how they occur together and from a temporal perspective, phenomenal time being the main subject of chapter five, and interconnectedness one of the main preoccupations of the author when concerning the book as a whole. That is, how can experience provide an account for the temporal interval, while also considering the framework provided by the phenomenal rather than the physical, a distinction that the author highlights with intent in the introduction. Dainton also notes that while the approach undertaken for the book is a phenomenological one, it also delves into matters of personal identity and the self, but also into aspects concerning the identity of the experience itself. Of the latter, Dainton states in the second chapter that it depends in part on its phenomenal character. Riddled with everyday examples but also with arguments that rely on a knowledge of psychology and neuroscience, *Stream of Consciousness* provides a multidisciplinary approach to the matters of consciousness, one that is worthy of examination, even if for the purpose of placing it in dialogue with opposing points of view.

15. Atmanspacher, Harald, and Eva Ruhnau, eds. *Time, Temporality, Now: Experiencing Time and Concepts of Time in an Interdisciplinary Perspective.* Berlin: Springer, 1997.

Addressing a general audience, as it is stated by its editors, *Time, Temporality, Now* confronts the often-tense relationship between the experience and the conceptualization of time, although not necessarily from the perspective of how one lexicalizes first-person experience and how to contextualize time from within the phenomenological method, but rather in terms of first-person experience versus traditional science, more specifically, the language of tradition science. With the topics of the essays ranging from matters concerning the natural philosophy of time, such as Alfred North Whitehead's theory of perception, or the deconstruction of time, to cognition, relativity and gravity, or non-relativistic quantum theory, the volume might not always reach its intended *general audience*. However, where it might demand specialized knowledge of the field, for instance when speaking of dynamical entropy and dynamical systems or quantum dynamics, it does so in a manner that invites further research rather than alienating the reader. The usefulness—if not even the purpose, given that it positions itself toward a general audience—of such a collection of essays for the phenomenology of time is one that cannot be denied, as it can help familiarize phenomenologists, and those pursuing a better understanding of the experience of time, with matters pertaining to traditional science, even if solely to give rise to more questions and inquiries that can be further used to address aspects of the nature of time from an interdisciplinary point of view. Also, together, the essays in *Time, Temporality, Now* crate a trace though the historical development of physics and provide an insight into how various concepts of time have existed throughout this development, proving thus to be a legitimately interesting read, especially for those who are coming to this particular collection from the side of philosophy/phenomenology.